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Abstract
Transparency has been widely promoted as a tool for improving public service
delivery; however, empirical evidence is inconclusive. We suggest that the effects of
transparency on service provision are contingent on the nature of the service. Specif-
ically, transparency is more likely to improve the quality of service provision when
street-level discretion is high, since discretion increases information asymmetries, and,
in the absence of transparency, allows officials to target public services in suboptimal
ways. Using finely grained data from the Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public
Administration Performance Index between 2011–2017, we show that communes that
experience increases in transparency also experience improved quality of education and
health (services characterized by greater discretion), while the quality of infrastructure
provision (characterized by less discretion) bears no relation to increased transparency.
The findings help us understand when transparency can improve service provision, as
well the effects of transparency reforms in non-democratic settings.
Keywords: Transparency; accountability; local government; street-level bureaucracy; Viet-
nam
International organizations, policy experts, and non-governmental organizations frequently
advocate transparency as a means of promoting good governance in general, and a efficient
tool for improving public service provision in particular. The dominant arguments derive
from the logic of principal-agent theory: Transparency increases the likelihood that princi-
pals will detect malfeasance or failure to deliver public services on the part of agents and
will enact punishment, thereby deterring the abuse of public power and helping to channel
government resources in a fair and efficient manner (Besley, 2006). While such arguments
are compelling, the empirical evidence is mixed.
This paper suggests that the effect of transparency on service provision is contingent
on the nature of the service in question. Specifically, we argue that transparency is more
likely to improve service provision when street-level discretion is high and low-level officials
consequently enjoy greater opportunities to target particular individuals within a community.
Street-level discretion leads to information asymmetries between principals (both government
and the public) and agents (officials tasked with providing services). Transparency reforms
can address these asymmetries – giving principals more information with which to effectively
monitor their agents, therefore helping to prevent low-level officials from targeting services
in suboptimal ways.
We test this proposition with finely grained data from the Vietnam Provincial Governance
and Public Administration Performance Index between 2011-2017, comparing commune-level
changes in transparency with commune-level changes in the quality of education, health and
infrastructure. Our results show that while transparency is associated with improved service
provision where street-level discretion is high (health care and education), it has no bearing
on the quality of infrastructure such as access to improved water and roads, where street-level
discretion is typically lower.
The paper makes several interrelated contributions. First, we develop a framework for
understanding which public services are most likely to benefit from transparency reforms,
thereby contributing towards reconciling the mixed empirical findings on the benefits of
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transparency noted above. In general, research has thus far paid little attention to how,
and in particular why, policy interventions may have different effects across different types
of public services, and consequently why the quality of public service delivery sometimes
varies considerably within the same country depending on the service in question (Kramon
and Posner, 2013). We suggest that the transparency may improve public service delivery
in some sectors while having limited or no effects in others. We build on recent attempts to
classify different types of public services in terms of the opportunities and challenges they
present for policy responsiveness (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2015), to propose that street level
discretion is particularly consequential for the effects of transparency reforms. Furthermore,
the paper considers the implications of transparency in a non-democratic setting, Vietnam,
where the fundamental nature of accountability is thought to follow a different logic than
in more democratic contexts (Malesky, Schuler and Tran, 2012). This provides insight into
how transparency matters in the absence of democracy, which is of increasing concern to
scholars and policymakers.
Transparency and Public Service Provision
Transparency is frequently advocated as a necessary condition for improving government
quality, promoting accountability, and reducing the scope for corruption and impunity (UN-
ODC, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002; Islam, 2006; Kosack and Fung, 2014; Bauhr and Grimes, 2014;
Bauhr and Nasiritousi, 2012). In recent years the transparency movement has gained mo-
mentum, building a sizeable and diverse community, including advocates of deregulation
and marketization, anticorruption activists, and community-based organizations.1 However,
empirical evidence for the beneficial effects of transparency reforms remain mixed.
On the one hand, there is considerable empirical support for the beneficial effects of
1This broad interest in transparency has resulted in two prominent multilateral initiatives – the Ex-
tractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a global standard aimed at promoting the open and accountable
management of oil, gas and mineral resources, and the Open Government Partnership, which aims to secure
concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency.
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increased transparency on public demand for accountability and better government perfor-
mance (Alt, Lassen and Skilling, 2002; Besley and Burgess, 2002; Brunetti and Weder, 2003;
Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). On the other hand, evi-
dence suggests that the effect of transparency varies across contexts (Malesky, Schuler and
Tran, 2012; Joshi, 2013), and that increased transparency can even lead to adverse effects in
some cases (Bauhr and Grimes, 2014; Chong et al., 2014; Bac, 2001).
While most of this literature has sought to understand the effects of transparency on
voting behavior or civic engagement (Bauhr and Grimes, 2014; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro,
2013; Banerjee et al., 2011; Chong et al., 2014; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2012), some
studies also focus more directly on the effects of information and transparency or public
service delivery in particular sectors, such as education and health (Bjorkman and Svensson,
2009; Lieberman, Posner and Tsai, 2014; Keefer and Khemani, 2011; Fox, 2015).
However, research thus far has paid limited attention to variation across different types
of public services, and implications of such variation for the effects of transparency reforms
(see i.e. de Fine Licht (2014)). Failure to distinguish between different public services, i.e.
treating one outcome as a stand-in for all others, can lead to misguided conclusions (Kramon
and Posner, 2013). For instance, while there is substantial evidence for a link between
democracy and education provision across countries, the relationship between democracy
and public health is much less apparent. In addition, there is some evidence that democracy
is associated with better access to clean water (Lake and Baum, 2001) but not necessarily
with access to sanitation services (McGuire, 2010). This demonstrates the potential danger
of studying only one public service outcome and then drawing conclusions about public
services in general. Thus far, there has been surprisingly little theorizing into why the effects
of policy interventions vary across different public services. A notable exception is Batley and
Mcloughlin (2015), who draw on extensive work in welfare economics, organizational theory,
and public management to develop a comprehensive “service characteristics” framework for
understanding and comparing the politics of different services. However, the number of
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dimensions along which services are allowed to vary in their framework makes it difficult
to identify which service characteristics are necessary and sufficient to take into account in
order to understand the effects of a given reform, such as increasing transparency. Our study
therefore represents an attempt to make this type of framework more tractable, by theorizing
and testing which service characteristics in particular are important to take into account to
understand the effects of transparency.
In addition, this study sheds light on the effects of transparency in non-democratic set-
tings. It is frequently assumed that authoritarian regimes fear media independence and
transparency, and will therefore do their best to “stifle independent criticism and analysis”
(Geddes and Zaller, 1989: 319). Transparency risks undermining opportunities for rent seek-
ing and constraining leaders’ freedom to maneuver and can thus inflict costs on authoritarian
regimes. In particular, transparency may facilitate collective action by citizens and thereby
expose such regimes to the risk of public discontent translating into coordinated uprising
and disruptive protests (Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2015). Such activities can pose
serious threats to authoritarian survival (Svolik, 2012).
That said, an emerging literature suggests authoritarian regimes may want to allow cer-
tain types of transparency. For instance, permitting activities such as investigative reporting
can help central government officials keep local officials in check and reduce local corruption
(Lorentzen, 2014). While the media may not be allowed to report on malfeasances at higher
levels of government (Liebman, 2011; Shirk, 2011), reporting on lower levels of government
can generate verifiable information on bureaucrats’ performance that will induce higher ef-
fort (Egorov, Guriev and Sonin, 2009). This is important given that effective public service
provision is often critical to regime survival and legitimacy (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith,
2009) and control of corruption in public service delivery can deter mass mobilization (Bauhr,
2017). Thus, as with institutions typically associated with democracy, such as elections and
political parties (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni, 2006), transparency may help co-
opt outgroups and thereby prevent potential threats to regime survival. However, save a few
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notable exceptions, scholarly interest in the link between transparency and public service de-
livery has focused primarily on the role of transparency in democracies (Grimmelikhuijsen,
2010, 2012; de Fine Licht, 2014).
Transparency and street-level discretion
This study sets out to investigate the extent to which transparency influences the quality
of public service provision, and also examines whether such an association is contingent on
the type of public service. We argue that the effects of transparency reforms are in part a
function of the information asymmetries characterizing different aspects of service delivery.
For instance, Batley and Mcloughlin (2015) suggest that information asymmetries are higher
in sectors such as education and health care as compared to waste collection. The authors
attribute this mostly to the later services being highly “professionalized” services, where
citizens cannot easily make choices by evaluating the quality and efficiency of services offered.
While a high professionalization of service providers is far from unique to the education and
health sectors, these types of services also entail a comparatively high street-level discretion.
In his seminal contribution, Lipsky (1980) defines street-level bureaucrats as “public ser-
vice workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have
substantial discretion in the execution of their work.” They include teachers, police officers,
public lawyers and social workers. These frontline bureaucrats play a key role as mediator
between the demands of citizens and those of the state, as they are ultimately the actors who
transform policy decisions into outcomes that affect citizens. The constraints and conditions
under which street-level bureaucrats operate influence the divergence of policy outcomes
from policy intent.2 Following the work of Lipsky, the concept of discretion has received
wide attention in the policy implementation literature (Tummers and Bekkers, 2014; Hupe
and Hill, 2007). While several studies have pointed to the beneficial effects of street-level
2Lipsky also discusses the tension between worker discretion and procedural consistency demanded by
considerations of equity and the conflict between worker autonomy and organizational requirements of su-
pervisory control.
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discretion, discretion also clearly limits opportunities for central government officials to mon-
itor the performance of frontline staff. Teachers and health workers have a particularly high
level of discretion, since both classroom teaching and clinical practices are difficult to specify
beforehand (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2015; Gauri, 2013). While discretion is unavoidable and
can lead to beneficial effects, it also makes monitoring more difficult and allows teachers and
doctors to more subtly target particular citizens by offering higher quality services to some.
Moreover, in many contexts, citizens seek to gain access to scarce public services by
attempting to bribe frontline service providers or use their networks to gain preferential
treatment. While the nature of these bribes can differ radically in kind (Bauhr, 2017), they
clearly upset the incentives of impartial policy implementation. From the service providers’
side, discretion can be used to facilitate the implementation of policies as well as better
respond to the demands of citizens, but also to target services based on kinship or clientelist
ties. There is empirical evidence to support this proposition from a number of contexts.
For instance, Gatua (2018) shows that social connections strongly influence the provision of
health care in rural Kenya. She finds that being a relative or close friend to a community
health worker doubles the probability that a household will receive a mandatory healthcare
visit. Markussen and Tarp (2014) use household panel data from rural Vietnam to show
that having a relative in a position of political or bureaucratic power influences households
to increase their investment in land improvements due to such ties. Their study suggests
that connections to office holders strengthen de facto land property rights and access to both
credit and transfers. Their results also indicate that officials prefer to use informal rather
than formal channels of redistribution to relatives. Connections to local politicians have
also been found to skew the distribution of targeted transfer programs in Ethiopia (Caeyers
and Dercon, 2012) and South India (Besley, Pande and Rao, 2011). Finally, Do, Nguyen
and Tran (2017) present evidence of hometown favoritism across a spectrum of office holders
in Vietnam, highlighting the relationship between their new promotions and new public
infrastructures in their ancestral hometowns.
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Transparency can help to prevent such undue targeting of government resources. Studies
find that budget transparency can lead to both beneficial economic outcomes and fiscal
performance (Alt and Lassen, 2006; Copelovitch, Gandrud and Hallerberg, 2018) and lower
levels of corruption in public service delivery (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005). Transparency
and public access to information can prevent the capture of funds at the local level and help
both citizens and central government officials assess the quality of the services delivered.
Without access to information about the budgetary resources allocated to a school or hospital
or who is eligible for a certain type of service it is difficult to assess whether services are
distributed according to the intention of policymakers or if certain individuals are neglected
for other reasons.
In sum, we suggest that street-level discretion influences the degree to which low-level
officials can target services to particular individuals within communities, enhancing the in-
centives for both service users and central government authorities to monitor street-level
service providers. Increasing access to information can thereby facilitate monitoring and
improve the quality of service provision. This informs the hypothesis we aim to test in this
paper: Transparency has a stronger effect on the quality of service provision in sectors where
street-level discretion is high than in sectors where street level discretion is lower.
We test this hypothesis using subnational, time-series data from Vietnam. Analyzing the
relationship between transparency and public goods provision in a non-democratic setting
represents an important contribution to the literature, and allows us to gain insights into
some of the factors that explain variation in the quality of public service delivery.
Empirical Strategy and Data
In order to investigate the influence of transparency on different aspects of service provision
we investigate subnational variation in Vietnam. Vietnam is a good test case for our theory
since it is an authoritarian regime with considerable subnational differences in the quality
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of public service delivery. In 1986, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) abandoned
the central planning model of socialism and decided to adopt a “market-oriented socialist
economy under state guidance,” also known as Doi Moi or “Renovation” (Beresford, 2008).
However, in contrast to its opening up of economy, the CPV continued to tighten political
control (Nguyen, 2016). Over the past decade, expert coders from the Varieties of Democracy
(V-Dem) have alternatively classified the regime as an “electoral autocracy” or a “closed
autocracy,” reflecting the country’s lack of free and fair, de facto multiparty elections and
other minimal institutional prerequisites of democracy.3 Furthermore, Vietnam is currently
experiencing an annual growth rate of 7 percent and living standards have increased (Nguyen
et al. 2013), leading to raised expectations about well-functioning public service delivery
(Giang et al al 2017; CECODES 2010).
We are not the first to consider the effects of transparency in Vietnam, though existing
empirical results are mixed. Malesky, Schuler and Tran (2012) present compelling evidence
of the “adverse effects of sunshine” in their study of the impact of a randomized transparency
experiment on legislator behavior in query sessions in Vietnam. In contrast, Giang, Nguyen
and Tran (2017) show that the quality of local governance improved in provinces and districts
that were subjected to increased scrutiny.4 The authors argue that even in an authoritarian
setting, transparency can facilitate a “fire alarm” style of public monitoring (McCubbins and
Schwartz, 1984), and that in such contexts, public shaming or upward accountability can
incentivize local officials to better respond to citizens’ needs. While these mixed findings may
at first be difficult to reconcile, it is important to note that the two studies are examining
the effects of different forms of transparency. As we note above, regimes such as Vietnam
may be hesitant to allow transparency at the highest levels, which could undermine their
authority; however, transparency at lower levels of government can provide incentives for
3For more information about V-Dem’s classification of regime types, see Luhrmann, Lindberg and Tan-
nenberg (2017).
4The authors use the 2010 pilot PAPI survey as a randomized intervention, allowing for the comparison
of provinces surveyed in 2012 that did and did not receive the PAPI monitoring ”treatment”. The authors
find that governance quality reported in later years by citizens in surveyed districts/provinces is significantly
higher.
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local bureaucrats to perform well and thus contribute to the popularity and stability of the
regime.
Our analysis compares commune-level5 changes in transparency with commune-level
changes in the provision of services that involve varying degrees of discretion by street-level
bureaucrats. As at higher levels, communes are divided into three branches of government:
an executive (People’s Committee), legislature (People’s Council), and judiciary (People’s
Court/Procuracracy) (Malesky, Nguyen and Tran, 2014).
The sections that follow explain how we operationalize our focal dependent and indepen-
dent variables, as well as relevant controls.
Data on Service Delivery and Transparency
Both our data on service delivery and transparency come from the Vietnam Provincial
Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI).6 The survey covers all
of Vietnam’s 63 provinces, and includes 207 districts, 414 communes, and 828 villages.7
Overall, PAPI surveys around 14,000 randomly selected Vietnamese citizens each year.
PAPI questions are organized around six main dimensions: participation at the local
level, transparency in local decision-making, vertical accountability towards citizens, con-
trol of corruption, public administration procedures and public service delivery We focus
on questions related to different aspects of service delivery (our dependent variables) and
transparency (our main independent variable). PAPI does not sample the same citizens
each year, precluding panel analysis at the household level. However, the fact that the same
communes are included in the sample each year allows us to investigate change over time at
that level of government. We therefore construct a “pseudo-panel” with the commune-year
5The commune is the level-3 administrative unit in Vietnam, below the province (level 1) and district
(level 2). We use the term “commune” to refer to all three kinds of third-level administrative subdivisions,
including the rural commune (xa), the commune-level town (thi tran) and the ward (phuong).
6PAPI is jointly conducted by the Center for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES)
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
7For more information on PAPI’s sampling strategy and methodology, see http://papi.org.vn/eng/faq
and PAPI (2011a).
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as the unit of analysis.8
Service Delivery
We consider how transparency relates to three main dimensions of service delivery: educa-
tion, health, and infrastructure (roads and water). Vietnam’s local authorities are responsible
for over half of total government spending, thanks to fiscal decentralization policies imple-
mented over the past two decades. In particular, district authorities have been responsible
for most of the recurrent spending in both education and health in most provinces. In con-
trast, the majority of capital spending is carried out by higher-level (provincial) authorities
(World Bank, 2015: 11).
The relatively higher degree of local control over health and education likely contributes
to greater discretion in the delivery of these services, as compared to services that require
more capital spending. Moreover, street-level bureaucrats play a much more significant role
in the delivery of education and health services. Within a given community, teachers and
health workers may favor some citizens over others as a function of social ties that make them
feel obligated to do so. On the other hand, local bureaucrats likely have fewer opportunities
to influence the quality of a local road or water source within their community.
In order to construct commune-level measures of education, health, and infrastructure
quality, we first identify relevant individual-level variables and then collapse them to generate
commune-level averages.9
Education. We consider respondents’ average answers to a series of yes/no questions
about education quality, which included items related to overcrowding in the classroom,
teacher qualifications and behavior. In addition, we include a question that asks parents
about their satisfaction with local education services.
Health. Next, we consider three aspects of health service delivery. Similar to the edu-
8UNDP periodically reviews commune lists following administrative border changes. As a result, some
of the communes in earlier rounds of the survey are not included in later rounds, and vice-versa.
9Table A1 in the Appendix provides additional details about variable construction.
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cation quality indicator, we construct an indicator of health quality, averaging respondents’
answers to questions on the performance of doctors and health care workers, as well as wait-
ing periods and expenses for treatment. We also consider respondents’ reported satisfaction
with the treatment they received as well as their reported satisfaction with free medical care
for children under six, had they or a household member used such services.
Infrastructure. With respect to infrastructure we consider both the quality of local
roads as well as access to an improved water source. In order to assess the quality of local
roads, we examine respondents’ answers to a question asking them about the road closest
to their house. We measure access to an improved water source by examining a question
about the respondent’s main source of drinking water. We recode the responses to generate
a binary measure indicating whether respondents are using “improved” sources, using the
WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program’s definition.10
Note that all questions are based on respondents’ reported access and quality. While this
makes them somewhat subjective, the questions are worded to relate to actual experiences
rather than perceptions or hypothetical situations.
Transparency
We construct two transparency indicators. The first averages binary indicators of whether
the commune budget and the list of poor households in the respondent’s village/residential
group has been publicized within the last 12 months. The second measure augments the first
by including information on whether the poverty list contained any errors (poor households
that are missing from the list, or households that are not poor but are nevertheless on the
list). As above, in order to construct commune-level measures of these indicators, we first
measure all variables at the household level and then collapse them to generate commune-
level averages.
Since the passage of the State Budget Law of 1996 (subsequently amended in 2002 and
10Improved sources include: piped water, boreholes or tubewells, protected dug wells, protected springs,
rainwater, and packaged or delivered water.
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2015), Vietnam has made significant progress on public disclosure of budget information.
Additional regulations require sub-national government (province, district and commune)
budget plans and final accounts to be disclosed. At the commune level, the president of the
commune people’s committee is supposed to present the plan and final account of communal
budget, including revenue and expenditure by sector and by special public fund. A notice
of the communal budget plan and final account is supposed to be available at the commu-
nal office within 90 days, with printed documents distributed to Communal Committee of
Communist Party, local CSOs, and village heads (World Bank, 2013).
In reality, budget transparency in Vietnam remains rather low. Vietnam scored just
15 out of a possible 100 points on the latest (2017) Open Budget Survey, indicating that
Vietnam provides the public with only “scant” budget information. (Only Myanmar is
less transparent in terms of other Southeast Asian countries assessed by the survey.) That
said, the PAPI data shows that there is considerable variation among Vietnamese local
governments when it comes to opening their budgets. While taking the initiative to open
commune budgets to public scrutiny is in part due to top-down pressures, it is frequently
a function of the actions of individual proactive public officials to comply with established
regulations.11
The importance of budget transparency for public goods provision has been alluded to
above. Disaggregated information on allocations and entitlements for schools, health clinics,
and other local institutions has been shown to be a key ingredient when it comes to facili-
tating demands for accountability (van Zyl, 2014). In the Vietnamese context, transparency
of poverty lists is highly relevant as well. These lists are an important welfare policy tool,
especially in Vietnam’s poorer regions, where households that are recognized as poor are en-
titled to receive a number of social benefits, such as access to micro-credit programs or free
medical insurance. If citizens are not aware of these lists, this could allow officials to place
undeserving people on the list while excluding those who should be included. Improving
11Personal communication with Do Thanh Huyen of UNDP Vietnam.
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poverty list transparency can thus serve to reduce corruption and facilitate efficient service
delivery to needy citizens (PAPI, 2011b).
Control Variables
In order to avoid omitted variable bias, we include a set of control variables that may also
plausibly relate to improvements in service delivery. From the PAPI we include variables
that ask respondents to rate the current economic conditions of their families (on a 5-point
scale ranging from “very bad” to “very good.”). We also control for the average education
level of surveyed respondents in each commune. These variables allow us to control for
improvements in the local economy and awareness among citizens that might be positively
correlated with public goods provision.
We also incorporate data from two external sources in order to control for population
growth, which increases competition for public services within communes, and economic
growth, which affects the financial capacity of communes to provide such services. To cap-
ture population growth within communes, we incorporate population data from WorldPop.12
We use QGIS to overlay commune shape files atop the population grids, in order to pro-
duce commune-level population estimates for 2010 and 2015. Constant population growth is
assumed within each commune, allowing us to interpolate the intervening years. A similar
procedure is used to incorporate night-light data from the United States Air Force De-
fense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Nighttime Lights Time Series,13 which we
use to proxy for economic growth, in line with a range of recent studies in political sci-
ence and economics (Doll, Muller and Morley, 2006; Henderson, Storeygard and Weil, 2012;
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). These data are available every year from 1992-2013.
12WorldPop combines census, survey, satellite, social media, cellphone and other spatial datasets to
produce gridded population maps, whereby population numbers per 100x100m grid square are estimated.
Gridded population data is available for Vietnam for 2010 and 2015. For more, see http://www.worldpop.
org.uk/
13https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html
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We incorporate commune-level data on average night brightness for 2011-2013.14 We calcu-
late the average growth rate in each commune over this period in order to fill in estimates for
2014-2016. Note that in less developed settings, night lights data have been used to proxy
for access to electricity (Baskaran, Min and Uppal, 2015). This makes less sense in contexts
such as Vietnam, however, where the most recent estimates put access at over 99 percent
(CECODES, VFF-CRT & UNDP, 2016).15
Finally, given that our analysis relies on a pseudo-panel constructed from repeated cross-
sections, we need to account for the passage of time. Even though the households in each
commune are randomly selected in each round of the survey, making each commune-level
average theoretically comparable with the previous and the next one, something might change
over time that makes them incomparable. We therefore include year fixed effects as an
additional control.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in the Appendix.
Transparency and service provision: mixed findings
We begin by comparing commune-level changes in transparency and the education out-
comes described above. Table 1 depicts a positive association between both measures of
transparency and all three education indicators. The control variables are not consistently
significant, though largely exhibit the expected signs.
Next, Table 2 shows how commune-level changes in transparency relate to changes in
health outcomes. Again we see a positive association between transparency and all three
health indicators. In addition, we see that commune-level increases in respondents’ average
economic situation are associated with improvements in health quality and satisfaction. The
14Commune-level night lights data are downloaded from the AidData geo Framework (Goodman, S. and
BenYishay, A. and Runfola, D., 2016), a repository for a large number of geo-coded data sources.
15Note that it was not possible to match all PAPI communes to the geographic control variables, given
inconsistencies in the spelling of administrative units between the survey and the shape files, as well as
changes in administrative unit boundaries. We use a fuzzy match procedure (the matchit command in
Stata) that allows us to match all but 17 communes in the PAPI dataset.
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Table 1: Transparency and Education (Fixed Effects Regression at Commune-Level, 2011-
2017)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quality Quality Quality Satisf. Satisf. Satisf.
Transparency Composite 1 0.06∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.06)
Transparency Composite 2 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.08)
Household economic situation 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.02 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Education Level 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Population (thousands) -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
Night Lights -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2894 2894 2796 2894 2894 2796
R2 0.009 0.012 0.024 0.017 0.017 0.027
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
positive coefficient on night lights also suggests a positive correlation between economic
development and health outcomes. Such a relationship has been well-documented both
across and within countries (Deaton, 2003).
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Table 2: Transparency and Health (Fixed Effects Regression at Commune-Level, 2011-2017)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Quality Quality Quality Satisf. Satisf. Satisf. Child Child Child
Transparency Composite 1 0.08∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.08)
Transparency Composite 2 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10)
Household economic situation 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Education Level -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.02 -0.04∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Population (thousands) -0.00 -0.00 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Night Lights 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2897 2897 2798 2897 2897 2798 2890 2890 2791
R2 0.019 0.023 0.086 0.015 0.017 0.049 0.016 0.016 0.056
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Finally, Table 3 shows how changes in transparency relate to changes in the quality of
roads and access to clean water. Unlike in the previous two tables, we find no relation-
ship between transparency and these outcomes. We interpret this as providing support
for our hypothesis, given our contention that in the Vietnam context, water and roads are
less affected by the discretion of commune officials. A number of the control variables are
significant, however. Again, local economic improvements are associated with improved in-
frastructure. This is unsurprising given that higher levels of economic development lead
to higher tax revenues, which can be channeled back in improved infrastructure. At the
same time, infrastructure can affect local development through many channels, including
improved agricultural productivity, increased rural non-farm employment, rural migration
into urban sectors (Shenggen and Zhang, 2004), as well as improved transportation and
telecommunication services (De´murger, 2001).
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Table 3: Transparency and Infrastructure (Fixed Effects Regression at Commune-Level,
2011-2017)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Roads Roads Roads Water Water Water
Transparency Composite 1 -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Transparency Composite 2 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Household economic situation 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education Level 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population (thousands) -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Night Lights -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2899 2899 2800 2899 2899 2800
R2 0.063 0.064 0.134 0.018 0.018 0.101
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 1 presents the coefficients of transparency on quality of service delivery from
Tables 1, 2, and 3, showing transparency’s significant and positive association with the
quality of education and health within communes, and lack of association with roads and
water.
These results are in line with observable implications of our theory – namely, that ser-
vices characterized by greater street-level discretion should be more likely to respond to
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Figure 1: Coefficients of Transparency on Different Services
Coefficients from regressions that control for population and nightlights, and include year fixed effects.
transparency reforms than those where frontline staff are less influential in determining ac-
cess to and quality of services.
Robustness Checks
The different results for transparency across sectors could be an artifact of survey con-
struction given that the underlying questions used to create commune-level indicators of
education, health, and infrastructure were not asked of exactly the same populations within
each commune. Questions about health quality were only asked of households that had used
a public hospital in their province.16 On average, about 63 percent of households had used a
public hospital in each commune. Similarly, the education quality questions were only asked
of households with children in public primary school. Such households accounted for around
25 percent of all surveyed households in each commune. We therefore may wish to know
if our results for water and roads hold when we restrict the sample to the households that
16While the questionnaire also asked about the year in which the household used the provincial hospital,
all respondents who had ever used a provincial hospital were taken into account.
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answered the questions for health and education. Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix show
that indeed, transparency remains an insignificant predictor of water and road quality even
when we restrict the sample in this way.
In addition to the concern that the commune level averages for health and education
variables might rely on different respondents, some of the hospitals are controlled by the
district level. We therefore check to see if and how the results change,when we aggregate to
the district level (one level higher than the commune). Tables A6, A7, and A8 show that our
main results hold: Improvements in district-level transparency are positively and significantly
associated with improvements in the quality of district-level health and education quality,
but not with average road and water quality at district level. The only exception is that
satisfaction with the quality of children’s health services is no longer significantly associated
with increased transparency. This likely reflects the additional noise created by aggregating
up to the district level.
Understanding the Mechanisms
The relationship between increased transparency and improved service provision that we
outline in our theory presumes that increased transparency can reveal the extent of targeting
within communities that is either at odds with policy or appears to be unfair. In light of
such revelations, we anticipate that community members and/or higher level government
officials will take actions to sanction the offending street-level bureaucrats and enforce more
equitable provision of goods, thus improving service delivery. We understand the extent to
which community members are taking action in response to increased transparency as the
enforcement of downward accountability whereas the extent to which higher-level officials
are taking action would reflect the enforcement of upward accountability.
It is difficult to test these mechanisms directly with the PAPI survey data, but we can get
at some of their observable implications. First, increased transparency should be associated
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with increased knowledge about service provision. We can examine this in the PAPI data
by considering responses to a question asking whether respondents think primary education
is supposed to be free. Vietnam’s constitution pledges in Article 59: “Primary education
is compulsory and tuition-free.” However, students have to pay various “voluntary” con-
tributions, including construction contributions, health insurance for students, and water
charges (London, 2010). In addition, poor communication from state agencies in charge and
manipulation by school administrators in some cases mean that a substantial proportion of
Vietnamese citizens are not aware of the policy (47 percent of all who answered this ques-
tion in the 2017 PAPI). Indeed, action research conducted by UNDP Vietnam and the Ho
Chi Minh Political Academy finds that poor communication and manipulation by school
administrators is an issue in some provinces.17
Table 4 shows that as communes become more transparent, a greater proportion of their
respondents become aware of the government’s free education policy. Such knowledge is
important for making demands for improved education quality in areas where local public
education providers may be misinforming citizens.
17Personal communication with Do Thanh Huyen of UNDP Vietnam. The reports detailing the action
research are only available in Vietnamese.
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Table 4: Transparency and Knowledge of Free Education Policy (Fixed Effects Regression
at Commune-Level, 2011-2017)
(1) (2) (3)
Model Model Model
Transparency Composite 1 0.08∗∗
(0.03)
Transparency Composite 2 0.10∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Household economic situation 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education Level 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Population (thousands) 0.00
(0.01)
Night Lights 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
Observations 2899 2899 2800
R2 0.013 0.013 0.040
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Additionally, we can examine another downward accountability mechanism by comparing
improvements in transparency with local participation. Specifically, the PAPI includes a
question asking respondents if they made a proposal or suggestion to the local authorities in
the past year. We calculate the average of respondents’ yes/no answers to this question to
construct a commune-level measure of participation. Table 5 depicts a positive association
between transparency and local participation.
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Table 5: Transparency and Participation (Fixed Effects Regression at Commune-Level, 2011-
2017)
(1) (2) (3)
Model Model Model
Transparency Composite 1 0.16∗∗∗
(0.02)
Transparency Composite 2 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Household economic situation 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education Level 0.01 0.01 0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population (thousands) -0.00
(0.00)
Night Lights -0.00
(0.00)
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
Observations 2899 2899 2800
R2 0.033 0.028 0.073
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Appendix Table A9 shows that this relationship also at the individual level, controlling for
important individual-level correlates of participation such as gender and group membership.
As an alternative measure of participation, we also take commune-level averages of house-
hold participation in the most recent election for the Chairperson of commune/ward People’s
Committee. Table A10 in the Appendix shows that communes that experienced increases in
transparency also experienced higher levels of participation in these elections.
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Given the Vietnam context, we anticipate that upward accountability may be an equally
if not more relevant mechanism than downward accountability when it comes to linking
commune-level transparency to improved service delivery at the local level. The PAPI cap-
tures this to an extent with questions on the coverage and effectiveness of People’s Inspection
Boards (PIBs). Vietnam’s legal framework includes a mandate for a number of local issues
to be “supervised and inspected by the people” (Nguyen, 2016: 35). These include the
commune budget, land management, results of investigations against corrupt officials, and
social services. Implementation of such supervision is envisaged through PIBs or through
mass organizations (Ibid). The decision to establish PIBs lies in the hands of the Fatherland
Front Committee at the commune level (World Bank Group, 2010). In theory, the PIBs are
established by citizens after going through a formal process of Fatherland Front Committees
convening elections for citizens to discuss and vote candidates. In practice, however, the
Party cells, the Vietnam Fatherland and local mass organisations meet and nominate PIBs
members and ask citizens to vote based on their lists.18 As shown in Table 6, communes
that become more transparent over the 7-year period that we study are also more likely to
establish such boards.
18Personal communication with Do Thanh Huyen of UNDP Vietnam.
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Table 6: Transparency and People’s Inspection Boards (Fixed Effects Regression at
Commune-Level, 2011-2017)
(1) (2) (3)
Model Model Model
Transparency Composite 1 0.48∗∗∗
(0.03)
Transparency Composite 2 0.56∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Household economic situation 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education Level 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Population (thousands) -0.00
(0.01)
Night Lights 0.00
(0.00)
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
Observations 2899 2899 2800
R2 0.127 0.114 0.153
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In sum, our results show that transparency is more strongly associated with better quality
service delivery in sectors where the discretion of frontline staff is higher. As for what
might explain this association, our results suggest that transparency can facilitate greater
knowledge and participation among citizens (downward accountability) as well as monitoring
by central government officials (upward accountability).
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Conclusion
This paper contributes to understanding the sources of variation in the quality of public
service delivery, which is seen as a key development challenge by international organizations,
policy makers, and scholars. We advance a theory suggesting that the benefits of increased
transparency for the provision of basic public service delivery may be contingent on the
nature of the public service, and in particular the level of discretion by frontline staff. When
these street-level bureaucrats enjoy comparatively high levels of discretion, transparency
can prevent suboptimal targeting of public services. When discretion is lower, information
asymmetries will also be lower, limiting the effectiveness of transparency reforms. In other
words, in the absence of transparency, frontline staff with high levels of discretion, such
as teachers and doctors, may use their leeway to target family and friends as opposed to
promoting general welfare.
Using commune-level data in Vietnam between 2011 and 2017, we provide support for
these claims. Our results show that commune-level changes in transparency are strongly
associated with improved public service provision in education and health, where street-
level discretion is high. However, increased transparency has no bearing on the quality of
infrastructure (improved water and roads), services over which local discretion is typically
lower. We also show that improvements in transparency are associated with both greater
public knowledge and participation as well as increased monitoring efforts by the central
government.
These results have a number of important implications. First, we provide evidence for
the importance of distinguishing between different types of public services when it comes
to understanding the effects of governance reforms. Specifically, our findings contribute
towards explaining variation in the effectiveness of transparency reforms across contexts,
highlighting how information asymmetries can limit the possibility for outside actors to
monitor performance. While the targeting of certain services to particular communities
or individuals can be very visible to outside actors, such as in the case of a road being
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built, other services allow officials to target services to individuals within a community by
influencing the quality of services delivered interpersonally, e.g. caring for a sick child. The
discretion inherent in these latter services makes it more difficult for outside actors to monitor
performance in the absence of transparency.
By situating our study in an authoritarian context, the findings indicate that trans-
parency can have a beneficial influence on service provision even in the absence of democ-
racy. In such a context, transparency can still facilitate downward accountability as well as
provide the opportunity for higher level officials to more effectively monitor the activities
of local bureaucrats to whom they have delegated responsibility. As such, if local officials
are distributing resources in a way that is at odds with government policy (e.g., favoring
friends and relatives), higher-level officials can sanction them in order to ensure that policies
are implemented in a way that benefit many as opposed to a few. In 2016, Vietnam passed
a new Access to Information Law, which has the potential to improve the transparency
of public services at all levels of government. Although the law is seen as relatively weak
(Centre for Law and Democracy, 2015), it may still give public officials and citizens greater
means to monitor frontline staff, and ensure that services are targeted in a way that prevents
widespread discontent. As such, increasing transparency in a place like Vietnam can serve
not only to improve the quality of public service delivery but also shore up the stability of
the regime.
Further research is needed to explore how these findings travel across contexts and regime
types, and also leverage alternative and more stringent causal identification strategies as data
becomes available. Explaining the sometimes dramatic variation in the quality of public
service delivery is an important challenge to both research and policy communities, and
understanding how services differ from one another may provide a viable avenue forward. In
the case of transparency, street-level discretion may be the key determinant of information
asymmetries, and thereby explain the uneven effects of reforms.
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Online Appendix
Variable construction and descriptive Statistics
Table A1 describes the construction of the main variables employed in our analysis. All vari-
ables are aggregated up to the commune level (taking the mean unless otherwise indicated).
Table A2 provides summary statistics for our dependent variables, measures of trans-
parency (and their component parts) and our control variables. On average, communes
report fairly high levels of satisfaction with education and health services, though fewer
than half of households are aware that primary education is supposed to be free. There
is somewhat more variation when it comes to road quality, and access to improved water
sources. It is also notable that fewer than half of communes on average know that primary
education is supposed to be free.
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Table A1: Description of Key Variables: Data Sources and Construction
Variable Source Method of Construction
Education
quality
PAPI
Average responses to following binary questions: Classrooms have fewer
than 36 students; The school don’t have three shifts; Teachers don’t
favor students who attend after-school study sessions in performance
evaluations; Teachers are well-qualified; Parents receive regular feedback
from teachers on the performance of their children
Education
satisfaction
PAPI
Response to question asking parents to evaluate the quality of public pri-
mary education received by the children in their households. Responses
are given on a 5-point scale ranging from “Very poor” to “Excellent.”
Health
quality
PAPI
Average responses to following binary questions: Health care workers
paid regular visits; Patients were treated with respect; Expenses for the
received treatment were reasonable; The waiting period between entering
the clinic and the time you received the treatment was reasonable; I/my
family don’t have to pay bribes to obtain better treatment service from
health care workers; The injury/disease was cured; The patient was not
advised to purchase medicine at a designated private pharmaceutical
outlet.
Education
satisfaction
PAPI
Response to question asking parents to evaluate the quality of public pri-
mary education received by the children in their households. Responses
are given on a 5-point scale ranging from “Very poor” to “Excellent.”
Health
satisfaction
PAPI
Response to question asking whether respondent was satisfied with treat-
ment received. (Yes/No question.)
Child health
satisfaction
PAPI
Response to question asking whether respondent was satisfied with free
medical care for children under 6. (Yes/No question.)
Quality of
local roads
PAPI
Response to question asking whether road closest to them is paved, con-
crete, gravel, or dirt. We rank these in descending order to develop a
4-unit measure of road quality, and then standardize it to range from
0-1.
Access to
improved
water source
PAPI
Response to question about respondent’s main source of drinking wa-
ter. We recode responses to generate binary measure indicating whether
respondents are using “improved” sources, per WHO/UNICEF Joint
Monitoring Programme definition.
Transparency
Composite 1
PAPI
Average binary indicators of whether commune budget and list of poor
household’s in respondent’s village/residential group has been publicized
within last 12 months.
Transparency
Composite 2
PAPI
Average of Transparency Composite 1 plus indicator of whether poverty
list contained any errors (poor households missing from list or non-poor
households on list).
Current
Economic
Conditions
PAPI
Respond to question asking respondent to rate current economic condi-
tions of their family (on a 5-point scale ranging from “very bad” to “very
good.”)
Average
Education
Level
PAPI
Ordinal variable with 10 levels, ranging from “No formal education” (1)
to “Post-graduate degree”
Population
Growth
WorldPop
Overlay commune shape files atop gridded population data from 2010
and 2015; interpolate intervening years assuming constant population
growth.
Economic
Growth
DMSP-OLS
Proxy with average night brightness for 2011-2013 and then fill in for
2014-2016 assuming constant growth within communes.
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Table A2: Summary Statistics: Communes, 2011-2017
count mean sd min max
Primary school supposed to be free 2899 0.44 0.19 0.00 1.00
Quality of primary education 2894 0.87 0.08 0.38 1.00
Satisfaction with primary education 2894 3.98 0.30 2.50 5.00
Quality of public health services 2897 0.87 0.07 0.50 1.00
Satisfaction with public health services 2897 0.88 0.11 0.17 1.00
Satisfaction with child health services 2890 3.96 0.36 2.00 5.00
Quality of road nearest home 2899 0.72 0.19 0.00 1.00
Household uses improved water source 2899 0.78 0.30 0.00 1.00
Poverty list publicized in last 12 mo. 2899 0.81 0.14 0.12 1.00
Poverty list accuracy 2899 1.58 0.23 0.58 2.00
Budget publicized in last 12 mo. 2899 0.66 0.20 0.00 1.00
Transparency Composite 1 2899 0.75 0.14 0.12 1.00
Transparency Composite 2 2899 0.51 0.11 0.09 0.80
Education Level 2899 5.21 1.30 1.12 8.31
Household economic situation 2899 1.97 0.18 0.88 2.54
Population (thousands) 2800 10.42 9.27 0.61 108.43
Night Lights 2800 19.15 17.92 0.00 64.59
As for variation in the transparency measures, we see that budget transparency is on
average lower than poverty list transparency. While poverty list accuracy is on average
fairly high, the average is brought down by some communes where it is fairly low.
It is also interesting to examine correlations between our main dependent and independent
variables. Table A3 shows that a number of the dependent variables are correlated with each
other, though the degree of correlation is fairly low. The highest inter-sector correlation is
between road quality and access to an improved water source – both of which are more likely
in urban areas.
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Infrastructure Regressions with Restricted Sample
Table A4: Transparency and Infrastructure - Only Households Who Attended Public Hos-
pital (Fixed Effects Regression at Commune-Level, 2011-2017)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Roads Roads Roads Water Water Water
Transparency Composite 1 -0.03 0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
Transparency Composite 2 -0.04∗ -0.03 -0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Household economic situation 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education Level 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Population (thousands) -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Night Lights -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2897 2897 2798 2897 2897 2798
R2 0.054 0.055 0.104 0.015 0.015 0.091
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A5: Transparency and Infrastructure - Only Households with Children in Public School
(Fixed Effects Regression at Commune-Level, 2011-2017)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Roads Roads Roads Water Water Water
Transparency Composite 1 -0.04 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Transparency Composite 2 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Household economic situation 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education Level 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Population (thousands) -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Night Lights -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2895 2895 2797 2895 2895 2797
R2 0.024 0.024 0.064 0.007 0.007 0.047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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District-Level Analysis
Table A6: Transparency and Education (Fixed Effects Regression at District-Level, 2011-
2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quality Quality Satisf. Satisf.
Transparency Composite 1 0.05∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.07)
Transparency Composite 2 0.09∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.09)
Household economic situation 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
Education Level 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 1448 1448 1448 1448
R2 0.016 0.020 0.035 0.039
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A7: Transparency and Health (Fixed Effects Regression at District-Level, 2011-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quality Quality Satisf. Satisf. Child Child
Transparency Composite 1 0.07∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.02) (0.03) (0.09)
Transparency Composite 2 0.11∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.13
(0.02) (0.04) (0.11)
Household economic situation 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
Education Level -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗ -0.01∗ -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 1448 1448 1448 1448 1448 1448
R2 0.027 0.032 0.027 0.031 0.030 0.030
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A8: Transparency and Infrastructure (Fixed Effects Regression at District-Level, 2011-
2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Roads Roads Water Water
Transparency Composite 1 -0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Transparency Composite 2 -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.04)
Household economic situation 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education Level 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 1448 1448 1448 1448
R2 0.123 0.123 0.080 0.080
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Additional Participation Regressions
Table A9: Transparency and Participation (Individual-Level Regressions, 2011-2017)
(1) (2) (3)
Model Model Model
Transparency Composite 1 0.15∗∗∗
(0.00)
Transparency Composite 2 0.17∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Household economic situation 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education Level 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Membership in political or civic group 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female -0.17∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Commune and Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
Observations 77104 77104 77104
R2 0.099 0.095 0.129
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A10: Transparency and Participation in Elections for Commune Chair (Fixed Effects
Regression at Commune-Level, 2011-2017)
(1) (2) (3)
Model Model Model
Transparency Composite 1 0.05∗
(0.03)
Transparency Composite 2 0.07∗∗ 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Household economic situation 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education Level -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Population (thousands) 0.00
(0.00)
Night Lights 0.00
(0.00)
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
Observations 2899 2899 2800
R2 0.002 0.003 0.205
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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